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Influences on and challenges for the ageing family and older persons in the People’s 
Republic of China 
 
Abstract 
The People’s Republic of China now has the largest population of older persons of any 
country. It is also a nation which has experienced enormous economic, social and 
demographic changes over the past three and a half decades. Traditionally, the family was the 
main social support for older persons; this changed somewhat under early socialism but, in 
recent years, the importance of family support has been reasserted. However, over this time, 
the family’s ability to support its older members has been considerably altered and arguably 
weakened. This paper reviews four key issues (population change, the hukou system, 
economic reform; general features surrounding modernization) that have gradually changed 
families’ capacity to provide support for older members. The paper considers research foci 
and public policy directions under which the state might take some responsibilities from the 









The People’s Republic of China (the PRC) is recognized as having become an ageing society 
since the last few years of the twentieth century. Due to the very large size of its total 
population, at over 1,370 million persons, the PRC now has the largest population aged 60+ 
of any country globally. In 2014, its population aged 60 or over was 201.3 million, 
accounting for about 14.4% of the total population. This proportion is expected to reach 32.8% 
by 2050 (Global AgeWatch Index, 2014). Over the past two decades, life expectancy at birth 
has also increased substantially, from 68.55 years in 1990 to 74.83 years in 2010 and is 
expected to rise to 78.8 years by 2050 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2013; Zeng and George, 
2002). 
 
The PRC has aged demographically principally because of drastic fertility declines driven 
specifically by population policy and socio-economic development over last three decades. 
Mortality decline in the PRC has also played an important though probably statistically lesser 
role in this demographic ageing. China particularly exemplifies the adage of ‘developing 
countries growing old before they grow rich’. Despite enormous economic development and 
increases especially over the past three decades, the PRC’s per capita income is still only 
between one-quarter to one-sixth of that in many Western industrialized countries (Feng and 
Mason, 2005; World Bank, 2014).  
 
Perhaps more important socially, however, is that whilst rapid development has been felt by 
almost everyone, it has benefitted some groups far more than others. Income distribution in 
the PRC has become very skewed, as in many rapidly developing economies. China has a 
relatively small number of rich people and a growing middle class and, whilst it has been 
noted that incomes have increased for both rich and poor groups, the rich have benefitted 
3 
 
most in the past two decades. China’s gini coefficient (used as a measure of income 
inequality) steadily increased between the early 1980s and 2008, since when it has slightly 
steadied but at relatively high level, indicating considerable inequality. This index shows 
many households are still living in relative poverty. Inequalities are seen particularly in 
urban-rural differences in incomes, as per capita urban incomes were estimated as more than 
three times higher than for rural households in the early 2000s and even higher subsequently 
(Sicular, 2013; Li, Sato and Sicular, 2013). Indeed, burgeoning inequality (and the fear of 
social disorder it could cause) has become an important policy concern and it also has been 
found that income inequality affects the health of older people (Feng, Wang, Jones and Li, 
2012). Ironically, urban-rural income and social welfare differences are explained at least in 
part by policy, in the hukou system discussed below (Sicular, 2013). These rural-urban 
differences are important for family and social care, as rural areas are the locations where 
many older persons live. A conflation of many factors combines to make China old but not 
wealthy socially and these impact on older persons and their families. These include marked 
imbalances in overall development, which is focused mainly in coastal regions and in some 
inland cities/provinces (Zhang and Zou, 2012), low coverage of pensions (particularly in rural 
areas) (Han and Wei, 2012), and high personal costs of medical expenses and sometimes the 
unavailability of medical services (Dong, 2009).  
 
Traditionally, the family has almost always been cited as the cornerstone of social support for 
older persons in China, which is also the case in many East and South-east Asian countries 
(Mujahid, 2006; Phillips, 2000). The family is the fundamental unit in social organization and 
‘family’ here refers to a group of co-residential persons who are based on marriage, blood, or 
adoption (Zeng, 1991). In recent years, the concept of family has not changed, but it has 
extended to recognize different living arrangements such as either co-residence or living 
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separately (in close proximity or at a distance). This acknowledges such changes especially in 
China many of which are underpinned by economic necessity, decreasing family size, 
changing norms and limited housing space, and also enabled by land reform which allows 
family member(s) to establish their own households more easily. A fundamental reason for 
these changes is economic necessity, resulting in work mobility and extensive labour 
migration, particular for rural persons (Hu, 2012; Kam, 2013), which have caused the 
‘biggest migration in human history’ (Miller, 2012).   
 
A traditional Chinese family usually included at least two generations (parent(s) and children) 
and it was also a very normal phenomenon for several generations to be living in the same 
household (Baker, 1979; Chu and Yu, 2010). Multi-generational (or intergenerational) co-
residence with older persons had been an historical basis for China’s traditional family 
support system for elderly persons. The system ensured, or at least tried its best to ensure, 
that elderly persons received financial support, health care and daily associations with their 
adult children or extended family members as an aspect of reciprocal or filial duty. Older 
Chinese family members are or were bestowed the highest respect from family members and 
society. 
 
Filial piety, the code of intergenerational duty, has been identified as the ‘essential ingredient’ 
that holds together the Chinese familial system of care (Zhan, Liu, Guan and Bai, 2006; 
Phillips and Cheng, 2012). Love and respect for older generations intertwine with the 
responsibility of children to support and take care of their parents, recognizing the care and 
devotion they received. Confucian teaching saw such mutual obligations as the fundamental 
philosophical underpinning of filial duties, which arose at all societal levels (Emperor to 
citizens; sons to fathers; husbands and wives and, today, children to parents more broadly). 
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The typical family model in China is sometimes termed a ‘feedback model’ as it involves 
reciprocal rather than one-way flows of filial duty, which can be expressed as 
F1←→F2←→F3←→Fn (F = generation). This model means that generation F1 fosters 
generation F2; generation F2 maintains and takes care of generation F1 when F1 is older; the 
same relations obtain between generations F2 and F3, and so on (Fei, 1983).  
 
 However, during Mao’s era and especially since the more recent steep declines in fertility 
and the increased mobility of young adults, family care and care provision have changed 
greatly although perhaps not yet as substantially as they are likely to in the near and medium 
future. Previous, Chinese socialism especially under Mao stressed the crucial role of the state 
and Communist Party and tended to de-emphasize the importance of families in all areas of 
care. This was especially the case in the ‘iron rice bowl’ era of guaranteed jobs and pensions, 
particularly in the government sector and state-owned enterprises, when the state provided a 
cradle-to-grave service for (mainly) urban workers through an enterprise-based security 
system. Under that system, in rural areas, older persons could often obtain food as a form of 
economic security from their production brigade which could protect their basic standard of 
living in a collective-based social security system (Dixon, 1982; Wang, 2006; Zhang and Liu, 
2000). All these provisions, in range and availability, began to reduce substantially with the 
advent of Deng Xiao-ping’s era of modernization and opening to the West, and the 
‘responsibility’ system in agriculture, which effectively ended the collective farms.  After the 
late 1970s, many features of the ‘iron rice bowl’ began to decline and most had effectively 
disappeared by the early 2000s. Many of the worst hit by this were older rural farmers 
without collective support and older urban workers who were not taken on in the new 




Meanwhile, living arrangements may have also changed substantially in recent years, 
especially in urban areas, but families still remain an essential ingredient of and basis for old 
age support in China. Their basic functions are still now stressed by the Chinese government 
(Du and Phillips, 2004), even if there were the attempts to reduce this familial reliance in the 
Cultural Revolution era. Today, there is not a single model of filial piety in China or the 
Asia-Pacific region, and its practice can be maintained by self-interest, including devotion 
and economic motivators, and even sanctions (Ikels, 2004). 
 
Some studies have noted that in China (as elsewhere), some better-off older persons may now 
prefer to live independently from their children (Sereny, 2011). This may also be forced upon 
some older persons, especially if their children migrate for education and work, which may 
raise living standards but reduces their proximity, as discussed below. It could also be by 
choice, as some older persons may prefer to live away from, or even independently from, 
their children and may not wish to be a burden on them. However, the essential role of family 
support for elderly persons has even been formalised in a national law, the ‘Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Rights and Interests of the Aged’. This 
legislation was initially enacted in 1996 and was updated in 2012 and it requires adult 
children to ensure their older parents’ financial and emotional needs are met. How this will 
work is as yet unclear but the law does state that employers must permit home leave for visits 
to older parents as required by the regulations (FlorCruz, 2013).  
 
An important feature, discussed below, is that today’s substantially smaller families mean 
there are fewer potential extended family members to personally support their older adults 
through co-residence. As a result, the responsibility for informal care falls squarely on the 
individual and his or her immediate family and, where no children are available, the 
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consequences can be serious. In addition, loss of a spouse (either through divorce or 
bereavement) often results in the older persons losing the support of their partner in their old 
age. Meanwhile, formal social security provision from the state for elderly persons is 
underfunded and underdeveloped (Feng, Wang, and Jones, 2013). Pensions are very unevenly 
distributed between rural and urban areas; in general, rural older persons are much less likely 
to have a pension (or a meaningful one) than their urban counterparts (Han and Wei, 2012). 
These differences are exacerbated as, in terms of medical expenditure, people are suffering 
increasing and relatively very high out-of-pocket costs, particularly in rural areas (Dai, Zhou, 
Mei, Wu and Mao, 2012; Dong, 2009). This currently means that the formal benefits many 
elderly persons actually receive from the state are minimal. A confounding feature is that 
different welfare and pension systems and subsystems are emerging in the various provinces 
and vary especially amongst the large and more prosperous cities. A universal rural pension 
has been proposed, although its value is minimal, as discussed below (HelpAge International, 
2013) and there are moves towards integration of urban and rural pensions (China Daily, 
2014) although how and whether this will be implemented is yet to be seen.  
 
Underlying the key challenges of ageing for the state and families in China today are 
population dynamics and socio-economic change. The increasing number of older people and 
the gradually rising life expectancy, coupled with the socio-economic trends discussed below, 
combine to provide enormous challenges to the family’s current and future ability to support 
their older persons. This paper identifies and reviews four main factors impacting on the 
capacity of families to provide old age support in the PRC now and into the near future. It 
also aims to highlight a research agenda focusing on their consequences. The four main 
issues identified are: 
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i. the impact of population change (population policy and social and economic 
development) and especially effects on demographic structure;  
ii. the impacts of the continuing hukou system (household registration system) 
iii. the effects of economic reform (open door policy), coupled with 
iv. the diverse effects of modernization. 
 
Current and future challenges for family support 
Although the family still retains the main role as the support provider, emotionally and 
practically, its ability to support older persons has almost certainly been considerably 
influenced by these factors now considered in more depth.  
 
1. Population change, fertility decline and smaller family size 
Before the establishment of the PRC in 1949, China’s average annual population growth rate 
was only 2.5 per thousand (Zeng, 1991), due to a combination of high birth and high death 
rates. This changed fairly rapidly after the mid-1950s as mortality decreased, though with 
some regression during the famines of the late 1950s and early 1960s, leading to an annual 
growth rate of about 0.6% in 2013 according to UNESCAP (2013). 
 
Figure 1 and 2 demonstrate population trends from 1949 – 2012 and Total Fertility Rate 
(TFR) from 1950 – 2010 in China. In terms of population trends, there were two baby booms 
before the onset of continuous fertility decline as a consequence of socio-economic 
development and the very strong one-child policy implemented in 1979. The first boom was 
during 1949 to 1957, with fairly high births (32 – 38 per thousand) and declining death rates; 
as a result, natural grow rates were high, at around 16 per thousand. In the later part of this 
period, the PRC government started large-scale publicity campaigns and training of ‘birth-
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planning’ personnel. With the ‘Great Leap Forward’ of 1958 and the subsequent coalescing 
of natural disasters and food production mismanagement, in the ensuing three years, the death 
rate increased remarkably (to 25.4 per thousand). Consequently, China’s natural growth rate 
of population fell to -4.57 per thousand from 1958 to 1961.  
 
The second baby boom was from 1962 to 1970 when birth rates were high (33.4 - 43.4 per 
thousand), and improving living conditions (especially after the Cultural Revolution) led to 
the death rate falling to 10 per thousand. The State Council in 1962 began a birth-planning 
campaign which included family planning measures, promoting contraception and late 
marriage. Unfortunately, just as this campaign was starting to show results, the Cultural 
Revolution swept the nation from 1966, disrupting this campaign along with almost all areas 
of education, health services and social life in general. Birth planning was lifted in the 
Cultural Revolution, and the natural growth rates rose to around 25.5 – 33.3 per thousand 
(Figure 1). At this time, the TFR remained high, at between 5.5 and 6 children per woman 
(Figure 2). 
 
When social conditions settled down again, between 1970 and 1979, the natural growth rate 
decreased as a result of decreased birth rate, which reached around 11.6 per thousand in 1979 
(Figure 1). There is also an obvious, steady decline in the total fertility rate during this period. 
China’s TFR was 6 in 1970, falling to around 3 in 1980 (Figure 2). The fertility decline was 
due to the combined effects of both increasingly strict family planning policies and 
improving social and economic development. The so-called ‘Wan-Xi-Shao’ policies (usually 
called ‘late-spaced-small’ families) were initiated in the period to 1979 as a concerted family-
planning campaign which made great impacts on reductions of the birth rate, and the natural 
growth rate. Wan refers to late marriage (mid-twenties for women, late twenties for men); Xi 
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refers to long birth intervals/birth spacing (3-4 years); and ‘Shao’ (literally, ‘small’) means 
fewer children (no more than two children per couple in urban and three in the rural areas).  
 
By 1979 onwards, at the start of the implementation period of the so-call economic reforms 
and the one-child policy, the cohorts of children born in the 1950s and 1960s were beginning 
to reach marriageable age. The natural growth rate fluctuated in the first ten years (1979 - 
1987), and then decreased, falling to under 10 per thousand after 1997, a decade and a half 
into the one-child policy (Figure 1). In terms of fertility, since 1979, the TFR constantly 
decreased and dropped below 2.1 (so-called ‘replacement level’) in the mid-1990s. By the 
end of the first decade of the 21st century, the TFR was estimated at around 1.6 children per 
woman (Figure 2). Population policies in the PRC have attracted considerable and ongoing 
criticism and debate. They have been justified by data indicating that, prior to 1978, even if 
each family had been limited to two children, the growth in population would still have been 
huge. Many estimated that resources would be overwhelmed. In mid-1978, therefore, the 
Chinese government decided on the infamous one-child policy, launched in early 1979 with 
the avowed aim of controlling the population. This policy allowed couples to have only one 
child; the main target was urban residents and government employees, both more 
‘controllable’ groups. Some modifications to the policy’s application have emerged over the 
past 35 years, including some variations between provinces. For example, couples in urban 
areas may be permitted to have a second child in certain cases: at least a five-year gap 
between the first and second child; if the first child were physically or mentally challenged; if 
couples were divorcees or when both came from one-child families. The bigger variations 
have been between urban and rural areas, as rural folk, especially farmers, have been allowed 
to have a second child after five years if the first-born is a girl (Mamdani, 2006). The small 
percentages of ‘ethnic’ Chinese minorities (non-Han citizens) in the PRC were generally 
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outside the remit of the policy and they could have several children. Social and economic 
development also played an important role in fertility decline in this period. Similar to many 
richer countries elsewhere, social and economic development in China is negative associated 
with the fertility rate. Indeed, it has been found to have played a decisive role in the transition 
to below-replacement fertility in some provinces in China (Cai, 2010) and particularly has 
influenced a more general acceptance of fewer children.      
 
Whatever the exact causes, it is clear that steep fertility decline has resulted in fewer children 
in almost every family, which has greatly reduced family size and transformed traditional 
Chinese living arrangements. The average family household size was 4.4 in 1982 and had 
decreased to 3.1 in 2010 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2013). This inevitably has social 
impacts. Fewer children per household almost inevitably means fewer carers and less 
immediate family support for elderly members (Zhan, Feng, and Luo, 2008). Even with the 
relaxations of family planning policy noted above, further relaxed in late 2013 so that couples 
of whom one is an only child can have two children, the total fertility rate will be above 1 for 
some time. Over time, however, the often-cited ‘4-2-1’ family structure seems to be emerging, 
meaning four grandparents, two parents and one child. In this, a couple (two persons) could 
potentially be responsible both for the care of one child and up to four grandparents, and even 
some may have surviving great grand parents. This would also imply the only child will 
eventually have to support his/her two parents and possibly four grandparents, as well as 
being part of a smaller working generation contributing to production and taxes. Moreover, 
the child will have no siblings with whom to share filial responsibilities. In combination with 
the absence of a meaningful universal old-age pension (discussed below), China’s 
considerable fertility decline therefore sets the scene for high pressure on adult children for 
financial support, health care and daily social care for older relatives in future. Whilst 
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probability analysis of life tables, death rates of older persons and later age of child-bearing 
in China have suggested that the impact on old age support of the 4-2-1 structure may not be 
as severe as some have predicted (Jiang and Sánchez-Barricarte, 2011), the general trend is 
still a very important consideration. 
 
Moreover, and potentially even more serious, the one-child policy has also had the 
unintended consequence of seriously distorting the country’s gender balance in the 
generations born since 1979. China, like several other Asian nations, has a long history of son 
preferences and the economic realities favouring sons in China (Ebenstein, 2010). For several 
decades, the number of male infant births registered has exceeded the number of female 
births. The sex ratio was 116.9 in 2000 (Goodkind, 2011), and it has been estimated that there 
are about 9.2 million ‘missing girls’ among children aged 0–18 in 2000 census (Ebenstein, 
2010). The gender imbalance is estimated to have slightly increased by 2011, to around 117.8, 
but is still enormously different from the ‘normal’ birth ratio of 105 males per 100 girls 
(Cheng, 2013).   
 
The growing gender imbalance has been a cause of considerable concern amongst policy-
makers, academic researchers and the media for over a decade. In general it has been termed 
‘the missing girls’, a phenomenon to be seen in India and elsewhere (McCracken and Phillips, 
2012), but particularly markedly in the PRC. It is seen as particular disadvantageous for the 
family care of rural elderly people if they only have a daughter, because the custom in China 
is patri-local residence which generally means daughters leave home to live with and care for 
their husband’s family. Comparatively speaking, elderly people living in urban areas perhaps 
have been thought likely to have fewer problems than those living in rural areas, because for 
urbanites, custom and practice are changing and son preference is probably less marked 
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(Bartlett and Phillips, 1997). Nevertheless, an acknowledged and considerable gender 
imbalance has emerged over that past three decades. A previously underestimated but 
socially serious consequence is that, in a country like China, where marriage has been almost 
universal, official estimates suggest that by 2020, there could be 24 million males unable to 
find a marriage partner (Cheng, 2013). Whilst current data suggest the gender imbalance may 
be stabilizing or slightly reducing, it is still very likely to persist for a complex range of social 
and cultural reasons as well as official attitudes to the topic (Eklund, 2011). This gender 
imbalance is unprecedented and its social, economic and care consequences, especially for 
older parents with a single son, are therefore very difficult to predict and are likely to worsen 
over the next two or three decades. So, the phenomenon has very considerable and 
unpredictable implications for social patterns and behaviour in the future. Problems are likely 
to be greater for parents with an unmarried son than for those whose sons are married. 
Specifically in terms of care for older parents, the unmarried future cohorts of males will 
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Figure 1 Birth rate, Death rate and Natural growth rate of China’s population, 1949-2012 




Figure 2 The evolution of China’s Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)  
(Source: United Nations, 2012) 
 
 
2. The impacts of the hukou system 
The Hukou (household registration) system is used to register the residence all Chinese 
citizens and classifies (or divides) citizens as ‘non-agricultural hukou’ (urban households) or 
‘agricultural hukou’ (rural households). It has long been recognized as an ‘invisible wall’ 
between the rural and urban sectors as place of residence gives access to certain levels and 
types of services and benefits. In recent years, urban-biased policies and development which 
have been concerned primarily with economic and political stability in urban areas, have 
exaggerated the gap between the urban and rural areas (Zhang and Zou, 2012; Miller, 2012).  
 
The hukou system has at least two major impacts on the family’s ability to be involved with 
an increasingly ageing population. First, apart from the effect of population policy (one-child 
policy) on the rate of population change, the population’s hukou status also has relations with 











hukou is associated with a higher total fertility rate (Cai, 2010). Conversely, a higher 
percentage of non-agricultural hukou (urban households) is associated with lower TFR. This 
is related to the fact that rural-agricultural families are more likely to be permitted a second 
child (e.g. if the first child is a girl). In the urban areas, the one-child policy has generally 
been far more stringently enforced and smaller families accepted, as noted above, hence 
giving lower urban TFRs. So, fewer children are available in almost every urban family to 
support older persons than in rural families. This greater stringency in application of family 
planning for couples in urban and rural areas is very likely hastening the formation of the 4-2-
1 family structure in urban areas.  
 
Second, urban-biased policies have protected urban residents’ welfare systems and prevented 
rural residents from participating in the welfare system and benefits in urban areas if their 
hukou registration is elsewhere. Urban elderly residents are now being fairly well covered by 
the social security system, including health care, pensions and education (for children, freeing 
them from costs and responsibilities). By contrast, new migrant workers (many of whom are 
former agricultural workers and with rural hukou status) in urban areas are far less likely to 
be covered by the urban social security system or given access even to education for their 
children. This has been a long-recognized source of complaint, severe grievances and 
dissatisfaction. The Chinese government has for some years been discussing reform or even 
abolition of the system and, whilst most commentators deem full liberalization rather unlikely, 
developments in late 2014 discussed below may indicate more serious changes may occur.  
 
At the root of urban-biased policies, the hukou system aimed to restrict the movement of 
population, particularly of labour from rural to urban areas, to protect the urban welfare 
system. It initially resulted in surplus agricultural workers remaining in rural areas before the 
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economic reforms (Wang, 2006). However, over the past decade or so, the demand for labour 
from the burgeoning factories especially in China’s eastern seaboard provinces has made 
wages so attractive that many rural hukou residents have migrated to urban areas and paid for 
their own healthcare and education when they could not get access to the state facilities. By 
contrast, urban residents have previously had the privilege of full employment, rising wages 
and, formerly, comprehensive welfare cover often based on the ‘iron rice bowl’ official 
employment or employment in the state-own enterprises mentioned earlier (Liu and Wu, 
2006) or simply from their urban hukou giving access to health, welfare and education. Even 
though there was growing demand for labour after the first decade of economic reforms, the 
state still implemented a full employment policy to provided posts for workers in urban areas 
(the ‘iron rice-bowl’) and steadfastly maintained the hukou system to prevent the sharing of 
jobs and benefits with rural migrants in the urban labour market until the 1990s (Liu and Wu, 
2006).  
 
Thereafter, the state somewhat loosened the hukou system to facilitate the movement of 
labour demanded by the ever-growing industrial development and the ever-increasing non-
state private market. China’s boom was giving annual economic growth rates of 10% or more 
until 2008, which had settled by 2013 at a still high level of about 7.7% (IndexMundi, 2014). 
Nevertheless, although rural migrant workers may work in areas classified as ‘urban’, they 
still effectively treated as ‘peasant’ by the hukou system, and receive unequal treatment in 
polices such as employment opportunities, welfare and simply their right to live in urban 
areas (Wu, 2001). Because of the current extreme difficulty in transferring one’s rural 
registration to an urban one (even though a person may have lived, worked and paid taxes in 
an urban for many years) and the concomitant difficulty in transferring one’s pension across 
cities until 2010, most migrant workers are far more poorly covered by the pension scheme 
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and consequently less willing to participate in the pension system (Wu, 2013). Hence, rural 
elderly people and rural migrants face a severe lack of economic security from the social 
support system, and they are more likely to rely on their families for economic support when 
they lose their physical ability to work (Cai, Giles and O'Keefe, 2012). In December 2014, 
the authorities announced another review of the hukou system to potentially grant urban 
status to rural migrants (Li, 2014). However, this may not be accepted by rural people as it 
could involve them giving up rights to their rural land even if they could then access urban 
welfare services. In addition, this review only focuses on current working age rural migrants 
and may not cover returning or older migrants, those less willing or able to contribute for at 
least 10 years to the urban pension, so its effect could be limited.  
 
At the moment, therefore, the system certainly increases the pressure on the family to provide 
financial support to their elderly members. By contrast, urban residents have been far more 
likely than rural residents to receive proper pensions when they retire and they can therefore 
lead more secure and independent later lives with a reasonable standard of living  (Du and 
Phillips, 2004). As discussed below, a universal rural pension has gradually been 
implemented since 2009, though its minimal value means it will have little real impact. 
 
3. The impacts of economic reform (open door policy) 
China has effectively adopted a market-based economy rather than a fully planned economy 
since 1978. Initially, many of the effects of the open economic policy were focused on 
selected cities and several Special Economic Zones principally on the eastern seaboard of 
China, such as Shenzhen (north of Hong Kong), Zhuhai (north of Macau), and Xiamen. 
Subsequently, the nation’s socioeconomic system has radically altered. The government’s 
‘central task’ as outlined by Deng Xiao-ping became to encourage people to get rich, 
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inevitably allowing some people and some areas to become rich far earlier than others (Qian 
and Xu, 1993). For most Chinese people, whether urban or rural or coastal or interior 
residents, politics, economic opportunities and social norms have become fundamentally 
different over the past thirty-five years.  
 
Economic reform has led to China’s emergence as a modern-day economic miracle, with the 
World Bank predicting it may rank as the major global economy perhaps as early as 2015, 
though some suggest 2021 is more likely (Giles, 2014; The Economist, 2014). However, 
social changes have also been as great, or greater, even if political reform has lagged. One of 
the major social impacts of the economic changes has been on the family’s ability to support 
their older persons. This is to be seen particularly in two features:  
1. Reforms of the old age security system (especially pensions) and health 
insurance/coverage mean large numbers of older people do not have sufficient 
pensions (and some still have none) and there is vastly reduced affordability of health 
care, and frequent difficulty in accessing health services;  
2. Spatial/geographical disparities in economic development have grown and led to 
marked increases in family ‘splits’, separations due to migration for work.  
 
Economic reform (as it is called) has been accompanied by enormous changes in social 
security for both working age and retired groups. Given the unequal institutional 
arrangements (eg urban/rural, private/state sectors) and unbalanced governmental expenditure 
on social security provision, many older people are not covered by a pension scheme. Han 
and Wei (2012) reported that fewer than a quarter of the elderly population had a pension, 
ranging from some cover for two-thirds among urban older people to under five per cent 
19 
 
among rural elderly residents although, as noted above, the new rural pension system will 
ultimately give a very small pension to most rural dwellers.  
 
Prior to economic reform, most urban workers (notably, civil servants, employees of 
institutional units, and employees of urban enterprises) received cradle-to-grave cover from 
an enterprise-based security system provided by enterprises or work units. Their pension was 
based on years of employment and their wages before retirement. After 1978, only civil 
servants or employees in institutional units were still fully covered by the state budget for 
their pension scheme. All the others were placed under the ‘Old Age Insurance’ (a 
contributory pension scheme funded by employers and employees) or, increasingly, were left 
to their own individual responsibility. Increasingly, the state has been unable to operate the 
numerous state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under central control and has had to delegate 
control to enterprises’ managers. However, many SOEs are inefficient and effectively 
bankrupt. The enterprises no longer met production planned by state and have had to face 
serious market competition from home and abroad for the first time. As many SOEs have 
accumulated huge financial liabilities for the retirement pensions of their retired employees 
and other forms of social welfare for current workers, many enterprises have had to make 
workers redundant and radically transform their social welfare provision. Many enterprises 
have simply been unable to meet commitments and have closed down. Many workers were 
only to receive a delayed or bankrupt pension fund just before the enterprises have closed 
(Jackson, Nakashima and Howe, 2009). Although the State Council expanded ‘Old Age 
Insurance’ to cover the employees of all types of enterprises in 1999, the system cannot cover 
laid-off workers from the bankrupt SOEs and private employees who retired before 1999. 
These elderly people who are now not covered by pensions are more likely to be thrown onto 




In rural areas, many people previously worked in People’s Communes (collectives) prior to 
the 1979 reforms of agriculture. Peasants had been encouraged to give up their land (their 
traditional source of security) and join the cooperatives through the promise of a welfare 
system that would provide security for the old, the sick, the widowed, the orphaned and the 
handicapped by 1957 (Dixon, 1982). Cooperatives owned the land and other basic means of 
production and organized peasants to work together and underwrote responsibility for those 
in need of welfare support (Wang, 2006). In this period, a shift in welfare responsibility 
occurred from the family to the commune (Dixon, 1982). Although it was a low-level 
collective system, older rural people could obtain food as basic economic security from the 
People's commune that could also protect their basic standards of living (Zhang and Liu, 
2000). After the economic reforms and the introduction of the ‘household responsibility’ 
contract system after 1979, responsibility for social security for rural people has basically 
shifted onto the household, based on farmers’ own resources. Although there have been some 
pilot projects for establishing old-age insurance in rural areas since 1986, the percentage of 
farmers insured by these was very low due to poor management compounded by institutional 
and policy changes from the government (Wang, 2006). Only 7% of the rural population 
participated in the old age insurance scheme in 2007 (Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 
2008). Cai et al. (2012) found that 92% of rural elderly people rely either on income from 
continued working or on their family for their primary source of financial support. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, because of reducing ability to work, older-old rural elderly persons 
are even more dependent on support from their family members than younger-old rural 




This has become an important socio-political issue in recent years and pension protection for 
rural residents was included in the 11th National Five-Year Plan (2006 to 2010). Most notably, 
the ‘New Rural Old Age Insurance scheme’ was introduced in late 2009. This is fully 
subsided by the central government in poorer western provinces and funded by both central 
and local governments in the richer eastern regions. However, the vast majority of farmers 
will still receive only very low incomes from such a scheme and they are more likely to 
choose the minimum option in the New Rural Old Age Insurance scheme due to their current 
financial ability and lack of trust in this system (Wu, 2013). Some traces of the traditional 
rural support remain, but only rural older people who are childless or disabled are still 
promised the so-called ‘5 guarantees’ from the civil affairs at the county level (food, clothing, 
medical care, fuel and burial), as their sole form of social security. The implementation of the 
universal rural pension scheme for rural dwellers has accelerated since 2009, and it is hoped 
to achieve complete cover by 2020. On paper, this may reduce rural-urban inequalities 
amongst older persons somewhat but as the value of the rural pension is only 55 RMB 
(approximately US$8.80) per month (HelpAge International, 2013), it is in effect of minimal 
value in an increasingly expensive economy. In many ways, the amount provided by the New 
Rural Social Pension Scheme is therefore more symbolic than practical. 
 
Health insurance has undergone similar radical reforms or changes since 1978. After that date, 
the health care of only employees of government and state institutions were fully financed by 
central and local governments and other people were either introduced to a Basic Health 
Insurance Scheme (BHIS, a contributory health insurance scheme funded by employers and 
employees) for urban residents or a New Cooperative Medical System (NCMS) for rural 
residents. Meanwhile, the subsidies for public health from the government have also changed 
greatly since 1978. The state set low prices for health services before these reforms; 
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thereafter, the state no longer set prices for health services and allowed health facilities to 
work on a profit basis for drugs or new and high-tech diagnostic services, with fees allowed 
to rise over and above cost to enable health facilities to survive financially. There is on paper 
high health insurance coverage, with 68.4% of the urban population covered by the BHIS, 
and 97.5% of the rural population covered by the NCMS in 2011 (National Health Services 
Survey, 2012; National Bureau of Statistics, 2013). However, public health facilities rarely 
offer services at the basic costs and stories of excess charges and of the need to pay doctors 
separately for health care services are rife. This has stemmed from the limited government 
funding for public medical and health care and the ‘liberalization’ of the system over the past 
few decades. The PRC subsidies for public medical and health care were only 6% of national 
government revenue (National Bureau of Statistics, 2013) and thus medical expenditures are 
now the major barrier for people in accessing quality health care services and some suffer 
from very high out-of-pocket medical expenses (e.g. Dong, 2009). This can particularly affect 
rural hukou people living in urban areas, who cannot access even the basic public facilities. 
Moreover, the Chinese media regularly reports growing violence against health care staff by 
dissatisfied customers, indicative of deep frustration with the system (Huang, 2013). Neither 
has the theoretically high coverage of NCMS in rural areas led to improved access to formal 
medical care or great improvements in health conditions (Lei and Lin, 2009). Indeed, rural 
older persons in particular are more likely to report unmet needs for hospital services than 
urban older persons due to the limited protection offered by the NCMS for rural elderly 
people and their inability to pay extra for out-of-pocket expenses (Dai et al., 2012).  
 
Impacts of migration after the economic changes 
The incremental economic reform was initiated in coastal provinces and state policies were 
initially heavily biased in favour of the coastal regions to attract foreign investment and 
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export-oriented activities (Zhang and Zou, 2012). Although economic reform subsequently 
extended to some inland provinces during the 1990s, including efforts to attract investment to 
the far Western provinces, the coastal provinces have benefitted far more than inland areas 
from the modernization phenomenon. Given their geographical advantages and more 
developed social and economic environments, the eastern seaboard provinces and towns have 
been far more attractive to foreign direct investment (Zhang and Zou, 2012). A major social 
consequence is that, ever since the implementation of the Open Door policy, China has been 
a nation of people ‘on the move’. Migration, principally for work in the rapidly growing 
modern industrial areas, has led to enormous growth in cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen. These are well known but many surrounding smaller towns have 
also benefitted and urban-industrial growth has spread extensively into surrounding areas on 
the eastern seaboard, which have effectively become urbanized. The migrants who have 
fuelled this huge growth of urban and industrial areas have come both from local and very 
distant rural areas (i.e. Skeldon, 2012).   
 
A second related impact of economic reform on family’s ability to support their elderly 
persons is thus from the family splits caused by migration. These separations result mainly 
from the increasing demand for labour in urban areas and coastal provinces and, given that 
the hukou system no longer restricted the migration of labour even if it did not allow transfer 
of social welfare benefits, millions of young adults have left their homes and migrated from 
poorer rural areas to smaller and larger towns and rapid economic development areas. 
Moreover, many have gone overseas for education or to live, as a result of greater incomes 
following economic growth. This migration phenomenon has further diminished many 




It has also been widely noted that rural-urban migrants are less likely to participate in the 
pension system as it is currently difficult to transfer one’s pension between areas. Although 
the majority of rural-urban migrations are young, and will earn good incomes compared to 
those in their former rural areas, they are at high risk if they lose their jobs or lose the ability 
to work. Financial coverage for those who are either laid off or unable to work is minimal. 
This has caused concern and the Chinese authorities are attempting gradually to improve 
social protection although this is imposing extra costs and taxes on employers and is 
sometimes resisted by employers in the private sector.  
 
The earlier reforms of the pension schemes mean that most rural residents do not have 
adequate pension protection and no longer enjoy the previous benefits from the collective 
farms. Many residents in rural areas have become what are called ‘left behind’ persons, and 
many are already elderly or in middle age, which will inexorably increase the pressure for 
finance support from their families. Indeed, Xinhua News Agency (2011) reported as many 
as 40 million older persons ‘left behind’ in rural areas in 2011. At present, such persons are 
often supported at least partly by remittances from their child(ren) working away in the new 
economy.  
 
Whilst it is recognized that migrants often send remittances home, for food, clothing and 
living expenses, distance and the ‘family splits’ mean there is a distinct of physical care for 
their older parents and it is such practical and day-to-day care that is often compromised by 
family splits. For example, the lack of a nearby relative to assist when an older family 
member is hospitalized is crucial, as there is often the need to provide food, bedclothes and 
even personal nursing care in Chinese public hospitals. It is almost impossible for the 
children in split families to perform their practical filial duties in a traditional sense, so there 
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is now some informal relaxation of expectations and there is growing popular belief that filial 
piety can be ‘substituted’ by cash remittances. Yet there is an inherent tension for children as 
mentioned earlier, since the law in China now expects children to care for and visit their 
parents. Unfortunately, however, even remittances may be under threat. Because of the higher 
living expenses in urban area, and the hukou system restricting most rural residents from 
accessing the urban welfare system, some migrants have to be cautious about both bringing 
family members with them and how much they have available to send back home. Education 
costs have become a particular pressure point (Gao, 2013), as private school fees are much 
higher for the children of migrants in urban areas as their children generally are not allowed 
to attend urban state schools; and health care is a similar issue. Therefore, often, their school-
age children remain in their home villages and have care provided by their grandparents, and 
Gao (2013) notes estimates of 55 million children left behind in the care of relatives or 
neighbours. Many rural areas have effectively a missing generation of working age people, 
and are inhabited by older adults and children below university age. 
 
It has therefore become very common for children to provide money for their older parents 
who take care of their grandchildren in return. This intergenerational reciprocity not only 
ensures some financial stability for the family but also can improve the well-being of the 
older persons (Cong and Silverstein, 2008). On the other hand, because of these financial 
obligations, many older persons have to care for grandchildren which may lead to both 
physical and emotional pressures (Wang, Zheng, Kurosawa, Inaba, Kato, 2009). Self-support 
is nevertheless probably the most common economic resource for many ‘left-behind’ older 
persons and, as discussed, support from local government or pensions is very limited or non-
existent, especially in terms of rural old-age social care (He and Ye, 2014). He and Ye (2014) 
also note that rural-urban migration has degraded the well-being of some ‘left behind’ elderly 
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people. Although many such older persons are able currently to look after themselves, a 
growing danger is recognized given the ageing of these cohorts who may be at risk when they 
lose the ability to work and especially those who do not receive remittances from migrant 
children. Their rural communities generally lack social support facilities especially, for 
example, for those with chronic physical illnesses or degenerative conditions such as 
dementia. 
 
4. The diverse effects of modernization 
In addition to these specific issues discussed that affect families’ abilities to care for older 
members, a wide range of other factors have become evident in recent decades. Social 
attitudes are changing in China, as may be expected, and sometimes rapidly. Therefore, 
although residence with adult children has been a traditional and even expected living 
arrangement, in recent years, especially amongst older people of higher socioeconomic status 
there seems to be some preference emerging for independent living (Sereny, 2011). Living 
alone or with their spouse only is becoming both acceptable and even perhaps more congenial 
to many older persons in China, especially in urban areas, who feel they can have their 
freedom and enjoy a better quality of life. It has for some time been noted that having a 
spouse is the greatest guarantee of support in old age (Chappell, 1991), even if caring for an 
ailing spouse can be a source of stress and even increase morbidity (Umberson and Montez, 
2010). A spouse may provide instrumental support, encourage a healthy life-style and 
promote health and well-being (Umberson and Montez, 2010). However, for some, this 
support may be in jeopardy as divorce has become more common with China’s rapid 
economic growth and modernization over the last three decades, and legal changes have 
made divorce easier. The crude divorce rate (per thousand population) increased from 0.33 in 
1979 to 1.59 in 2007, and reached 2.29 in 2012 (Wang and Zhou, 2010; Ministry of Civil 
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Affairs, 2013). Divorce may lead to the loss of a spouse’s support in old age and 
disadvantage children. Yet worse, as daughters-in-law have traditionally been responsible for 
care of their husband’s parents, divorce often deprives some older people of a potential carer. 
 
Remarriage, formerly rare, has also concomitantly increased in the PRC over the last three 
decades with the percentage of remarriages among marriages increasing from 3.05% in 1985 
to 10.24% in 2007 (Wang and Zhou, 2010). However, it is still less common among older 
persons and especially for older persons who have lost their spouse. The Chinese census of 
2010 found that 27% of the elderly population are widowed. Yet, whilst a survey by the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences suggests that 80% of the widowed elderly people would 
like to remarry, fewer than 10% of them actually register for marriage (Wang, 2013). This is 
thought to be because older people in China encounter enormous obstacles and objections 
from their children when seeking remarriage, due to expectations and concerns over 
allocation of family assets, as well as housing and care responsibilities. Attitudinal changes 
that encourage widows and widowers to remarry could be one aspect of modernization that 
may potentially help reduce the pressure of providing support from children whilst improving 
quality of life. Remarriage was once a taboo topic especially among older generations but it 
seems that attitudes may be gradually changing in China as well as elsewhere in the region 
(Phillips and Cheng, 2012). 
 
Social welfare institutions are growing as another option to assist older persons and support 
carers. The original objectives of old age residential institutions in China were to 
accommodate the ‘three-nos’ older people: those with little or no income, no living children, 
and unable to work. After the economic reforms, Chinese policies in rural areas allowed only 
elderly people who had no close relatives to reside in government-subsidized institutions. In 
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urban areas, there are however increasing numbers of private old age homes, with improving 
facilities, and institutional policies are relatively less restrictive. As a result, there are more 
older persons living in institutional settings, again something that was previously socially 
frowned on. By the late 1990s, many publicly-owned nursing homes extended their services 
to older people who could pay, by themselves or via their children (Gu, Dupre and Liu, 2007). 
This is also an important attitudinal and practical change and one that appears to be 
accelerating. In 2012, the number of beds in elderly care institutions reached 21.48 per 1,000 
senior citizens (National Bureau of Statistics, 2013). This is still an area of some social 
controversy and residential care is also in need of improvement both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. It is, nevertheless, an area in which to expect major growth in the coming 
decade and its growth may well affect dynamics of family care as has occurred in the West.  
 
Conclusions and a research agenda 
This paper has reviewed four important and closely interlinked areas of challenge to the 
family’s ability to engage with an ageing population in China. Although the family’s ability 
to support older persons is certainly weakening, families still remain the main source of 
social support for the older persons. The quantity of support from the state is currently too 
limited to provide much support for older persons in general and beneficiaries are relatively 
few. Traditionally, the family in China has been the cornerstone of social support for older 
persons. Moreover, its role and obligations have been legally defined and are increasingly 
emphasised by a state that recognizes the need but is not devoting the resources to this age 
group.  
 
In spite of a continuing strong attachment to the concepts of family care and filial piety, many 
people of all ages now acknowledge it is time for the state to assume greater responsibility, to 
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relieve the burden, enhance the support for care when provided by the family and to improve 
the quality and quantity of public support for older persons. This leads to a major focus of 
future research based on the four areas discussed.  
 
In particular, both the policy implications and means of implementing formal state care in a 
manner that supports family care must be investigated. The ways in which pensions and 
social care can be provided, extended and sustained are also a key research area. Another area 
of concern is identifying practical means by which the state can abolish the unequal 
institutional arrangements and unbalanced governmental expenditure in social security 
provision, especially to reduce disparities between urban and rural areas. The practicalities of 
reforming or even abandoning the hukou system are already under discussion but 
implementation remains as yet stubbornly a way off. Therefore, in the interim, means by 
which to provide practical support for split families in the modern economic boom is a 
related research priority. The practicalities of extending government expenditure for rural 
residents’ pension schemes, again to reduce rural-urban inequalities, is a further focus.  
 
Finally, research and policies must address the growing disparities between rich and poor and 
between geographical areas, as these are socially divisive and undermine the cohesiveness of 
families that the state is trying to reassert. Therefore, ways in which the benefits of China’s 
economic miracle can be more fairly distributed across the whole country is a fundamental 
research focus which might help families and intergenerational relations. Could there, for 
example, be greater promotion of inland or less developed areas, including development of 
services and infrastructure, to attract foreign direct investment? If successful, fewer young 
adults might be obliged to migrate for work or education. This could greatly benefit the 
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